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Abstract  
The release of Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine has popularized the notion that 
neoliberalism has relied on the rhetoric of crisis and emergency to persuade citizens to 
accept its economic dictates. How then does one “sell” the neoliberal vision when 
there can be no recourse to crisis rhetoric, particularly to a population steeped in a 
social democratic political culture? It is this question that this essay attempts to resolve 
by investigating the discourse of the “New Saskatchewan” that has been a favourite 
and recurrent meme of the Saskatchewan Party since the 2003 electoral campaign. This 
paper will argue that rather than relying on the rhetoric of crisis, the “New 
Saskatchewan” puts forward a discourse of prosperity that promises to unleash the full 
economic potential of the province through neoliberal economic policy. Moreover, the 
“New Saskatchewan” (NS) discourse has been specifically tailored to advance this 
neoliberal project in Saskatchewan by taking special care to address the local 
specificities unique to the politics of the province, while drawing upon historical 
narratives and themes that have been emblematic of Saskatchewan political history. 
 
Résumé 
La parution du livre The Shock Doctrine par Naomi Klein a popularisé l’idée que le 
néolibéralisme dépend d’une rhétorique de crise et d’urgence afin de persuader les 
citoyens d’accepter ses préceptes économiques. Comment peut‐on vendre la vision 
néolibérale lorsqu’on ne peut pas recourir à une rhétorique de crise, en particulier vis‐
à‐vis d’une population imprégnée d’une culture politique social‐démocrate? Cet article 
s’adresse à cette question en examinant le discours de la Nouvelle Saskatchewan qui a 
été un mème favori et récurrent du parti Saskatchewanais depuis la campagne 
électorale de 2003. Cet article soutient que, plutôt que de se baser sur une rhétorique 
de crise, la Nouvelle Saskatchewan propose un discours de prospérité en promettant 
de déclencher le potentiel économique de la province par l’entremise d’une politique 
économique néo‐libérale. Qui plus est, le discours de la Nouvelle Saskatchewan (NS) a 
été spécifiquement ajusté pour avancer le projet néo‐libéral en Saskatchewan en 
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abordant le caractère unique de la politique de la province, tout en puisant dans les 
récits historiques et thèmes qui ont été emblématiques de l’histoire politique de la 
Saskatchewan. 
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The	implementation	of	neoliberalism	throughout	the	western	liberal	
democracies	has	often	been	framed	less	as	a	choice	and	more	an	
inevitability.	Thatcher’s	mantra	“that	there	is	no	alternative,”	was	
premised	on	the	assumption	that	global	markets	would	unduly	punish	
those	that	failed	to	accept	the	cold	market	logic	of	neoliberal	economics.	
Naomi	Klein	(2007)	has	more	recently	popularized	the	notion	that	the	
institution	of	neoliberalism	has	relied	on	the	rhetoric	of	crisis	and	
emergency	to	‘persuade’	citizens	to	accept	its’	economic	dictates.	
Certainly,	the	history	of	neoliberalism	in	Canada	has	followed	much	
of	this	script.		
Brian	Mulroney’s	inaugural	foray	into	neoliberal	austerity	in	the	late	1980s	
and	early	1990s	was	prefaced	by	dire	warnings	that	Canada	was	“choking	
on	debt”	imperilling	the	country’s	very	sovereignty	(Toronto	Star,	13	
November	1992;	Winsor	1989).	Similarly,	Paul	Martin’s	1995	neoliberal	
budget	was	presaged	with	allusions	to	Mexico’s	peso	crisis,	International	
Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	imposed	structural	adjustment	and	eventual	fiscal	
ruin	for	the	country	if	the	debt	and	deficits	were	not	immediately	slain	
(Clarke	1997,	83‐84).1	
The	use	of	debt	and	deficit	discourse	to	prepare	the	way	for	
neoliberalism	has	certainly	not	been	confined	to	the	federal	government.	In	
Ontario,	Premier	Mike	Harris	claimed	the	province	was	“bankrupt”	on	the	
eve	of	his	government’s	draconian	first	“Common	Sense”	budget,	declaring	
that	“major	change”	and	even	“amputation”	of	social	programs	was	a	
required	necessity	(Wright	1995,	A1).	Alberta’s	Ralph	Klein	was	equally	
adept	at	using	debt	crisis	rhetoric.	As	Taras	and	Tupper	(1994,	71)	
explained	at	the	time,	the	Klein	government	“used	its	crusade	against	the	
deficit	[to	initiate]	a	program	of	social	engineering,	the	reordering	of	
                                                 
1 For a wider discussion of the strategies used to “sell” neoliberalism to Canadians since the 
1970s, see Enoch 2007. 
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societal	institutions	and	priorities	to	fit	a	particular	ideological	mould	that	
is	virtually	without	precedent	in	recent	Canadian	history.”	Even	in	social	
democratic	Saskatchewan,	the	discourse	of	economic	crisis	was	a	prime	
rhetorical	lever	used	to	roll	out	the	Romanow	government’s	Third	Way	
variant	of	neoliberalism	in	the	early	1990s	(McGrane	2006).	
In	this	sense,	we	can	view	the	use	of	debt	crisis	discourse	as	
constituting	what	Marjorie	Griffin	Cohen	calls	a	“conditioning	framework;”	
the	means	to	publicly	legitimize	the	withdrawal	of	the	state	from	key	areas	
of	social	provision.	“The	economic	logic	for	deconstructing	the	welfare	
state”	Cohen	(1997,	33)	writes,	“had	to	become	part	of	the	subconscious	
way	people	understood	the	working	of	the	economic	system	in	order	to	
erase	the	public’s	attachment	to	‘expensive’	social	programs.”	
We	might	say	then,	that	in	Canada,	it	has	been	the	“stick”	of	fiscal	
crisis	much	more	than	the	“carrot”	of	purported	economic	prosperity	
implicit	in	neoliberal	discourse	that	has	been	utilized	as	the	means	to	“sell”	
neoliberal	policy	to	a	usually	sceptical,	if	not	recalcitrant	public.			
How	then	does	one	“sell”	the	neoliberal	vision	when	there	can	be	no	
recourse	to	crisis	rhetoric,	particularly	to	a	population	steeped	in	a	social	
democratic	political	culture?	This	is	the	situation	that	has	characterized	
Saskatchewan	politics	over	the	past	five	years.	Brad	Wall’s	Saskatchewan	
Party	government	inherited	a	vibrant	economy	that	has	outpaced	the	rest	
of	the	country	and	has	(so	far)	been	relatively	unaffected	by	the	global	
recession	(McGrane	2007).	How	then,	has	the	Wall	government	sought	to	
“sell”	its	variant	of	neoliberalism	in	Saskatchewan	at	a	time	of	supposed	
economic	prosperity	and	to	a	population	that	still	remains	relatively	
wedded	to	the	social	democratic	culture	of	the	past?	It	is	this	question	that	
this	essay	attempts	to	resolve	by	investigating	the	discourse	of	the	“New	
Saskatchewan”	that	has	been	a	favourite	and	recurrent	meme	of	the	
Saskatchewan	Party	since	the	2003	electoral	campaign.	This	paper	will	
argue	that	rather	than	relying	on	the	rhetoric	of	crisis,	the	“New	
Saskatchewan”	puts	forward	a	discourse	of	prosperity	that	promises	to	
unleash	the	full	economic	potential	of	the	province	through	neoliberal	
economic	policy.	Moreover,	the	“New	Saskatchewan”	(NS)	discourse	has	
been	specifically	tailored	to	advance	this	neoliberal	project	in	
Saskatchewan	by	taking	special	care	to	address	the	local	specificities	
unique	to	the	politics	of	the	province,	while	drawing	upon	historical	
narratives	and	themes	that	have	been	emblematic	of	Saskatchewan	
political	history.		
	 To	investigate	this	question,	this	paper	will	first	describe	the	
dominant	themes	within	neoliberal	discourse	and	the	importance	of	
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language	to	the	neoliberal	project.	Following	this,	the	contours	of	the	
discourse	of	the	‘New	Saskatchewan’	will	be	outlined	drawing	upon	
Saskatchewan	Party	election	platforms	and	from	speeches,	statements	and	
interviews	with	Brad	Wall	from	2004	until	the	present.	The	historical	
affinities	and	differences	of	the	NS	discourse	to	the	rhetoric	of	the	Ross	
Thatcher	and	Grant	Devine	governments	will	also	be	considered.	To	
conclude,	the	efficacy	of	the	NS	discourse	to	persuade	the	public	to	
embrace	neoliberalism	as	the	way	forward	will	be	evaluated.	
	
Neoliberalism and Discourse 
Despite	being	what	Robert	McChesney	(1998)	describes	as	“the	defining	
political	economic	paradigm	of	our	time,”	the	spread	of	neoliberal	
economic	policies	remains	uneven,	as	various	jurisdictions	display	
differing	levels	of	ideological	and	political	adherence	to	the	doctrine	(Birch	
and	Mykhnenko	2010).	Nevertheless,	Birch	and	Mykhnenko	identify	five	
core	principles	that	have	been	emblematic	of	neoliberalism	wherever	it	has	
been	implemented:	
	
privatization of state‐run assets (firms, council housing, et cetera); liberalization 
of trade in goods and capital investment; monetarist focus on inflation control 
and supply‐side dynamics; deregulation of labour and product markets to 
reduce ‘impediments’ to business; and, the marketization of society through 
public‐private partnerships and other forms of commodification. (Birch and 
Mykhnenko 2010, 5) 
	
As	Norman	Fairclough	(2005,	31)	observes,	discourse	is	essential	to	the	
support	and	legitimacy	of	the	neoliberal	project	because	it	relies	centrally	
on	the	process	of	imposing	new	representations	on	the	world	as	it	makes	a	
“contingent	set	of	policy	choices	appear	to	be	a	matter	of	inexorable	and	
irreversible	world	change.”	The	ability	of	neoliberalism	to	present	itself	as	
an	inevitable	and	ineluctable	result	of	progress	requires	a	supporting	
discourse	that	buttresses	its	truth	claims.	While	all	political	projects	rely	
on	discursive	representations	to	win	public	support,	the	discourse	of	
neoliberalism	contains	a	number	of	distinctive	elements	that	have	been	
regularly	utilized	to	garner	popular	legitimacy.	Fairclough	identifies	the	
various	symbolic	resources	that	have	been	deployed	in	pursuit	of	the	
neoliberal	project	as	follows:	
	
This [neoliberal] discourse includes a narrative of progress; the globalized world 
offers unprecedented opportunities for ‘growth’ through intensified 
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‘competition,’ but requiring unfettered ‘free trade’ and the dismantling of 
‘state bureaucracy’ and ‘unaffordable’ welfare programmes, ‘flexibility’ of 
labour, ‘transparency,’ ‘modernization’ and so forth. This discourse projects 
and contributes to actualizing new forms of productive activity, new social 
relations, new forms of identity, new values, etc. It appears in specific forms 
and transformations in different spheres of life (Fairclough 2000, 148). 
	
What	this	often	means	in	practice	is	that	neoliberal	discourse	attempts	to	
create	a	new	individualized	“citizen‐subject,”	encouraging	people	to	see	
themselves	as	individualized	and	active	subjects	solely	“responsible	for	
enhancing	their	own	well‐being”	without	recourse	to	state	aid	or	
assistance	(Larner	2000,13).	For	Wendy	Brown,	this	can	produce	the	
“citizen‐consumer”	for	whom:		
	
navigating the social becomes entirely one of discerning, affording, and 
procuring a personal solution to every socially produced problem. This is 
depoliticization on an unprecedented level: the economy is tailored to it, 
citizenship is organized by it, the media are dominated by it, and the political 
rationality of neoliberalism frames and endorses it. (Brown 2006, 704) 
	
Collective	provision	and	social	citizenship	are	anathema	to	this	conception,	
as	responsibility	for	everything	from	employment	and	education	to	health	
and	well‐being	are	shifted	from	the	state	to	the	individual.	Under	such	a	
regime	we	must	become	“Entrepreneurs	of	the	Self,”	making	continuous	
personal	investments	in	skills,	training,	education,	and	health	in	order	to	
both	increase	our	marketability	in	a	competitive	labour	market	and	to	
weather	the	risk	and	insecurity	emblematic	of	the	neoliberal	economic	
paradigm	(Peters	2001).	Life	becomes	a	“continuous	economic	
capitalization	of	the	self”	(Rose	1999,	161).2		
However,	despite	these	continuities,	the	discourse	used	to	support	
neoliberal	policies	can	be	as	equally	heterogenous	as	the	application	of	
neoliberalism	itself.	Fairclough	(2005,	31)	observes	that	in	the	case	of	a	
                                                 
2 We need to be cognizant that the intent of neoliberal discourse to produce an individualized 
subjectivity does not necessarily make it so. Too often the adoption of individualizing practices 
by  persons  are  assumed  to  entail  a wholesale  embrace  of  neoliberal  rationality, when  the 
adoption of these practices may be more a matter of routine economic survival. The failure to 
adequately  locate resistance to  these discourses and practices can make  it appear  that  they 
have  been  internalized, when  the  reality may  be  quite  the  opposite.  For  a  critique  of  this 
tendency in academic studies of individualizing discourses and practices in the workplace, see 
Thompson and Ackroyd 1995.  
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strategy	such	as	neoliberalism	which	has	been	“so	widely	diffused,	on	so	
many	different	scales,	and	recontextualized	in	so	many	different	countries,	
institutions	and	organizations,”	that	we	are	often	faced	with	a	“complex	
field	of	dispersal	in	narratives	and	discourses,”	where	as	well	as	
“recognizable	continuities	we	find	considerable	diversity,	associated	with	
the	proliferation	of	contexts	and	circumstances.”	Thus,	neoliberal	
discourse	must	fashion	itself	according	to	local	specificities	and	historical	
contingencies	unique	to	the	terrain	in	which	it	attempts	to	legitimize	its	
project.	Indeed,	the	Saskatchewan	Party’s	deployment	of	its	own	unique	
brand	of	neoliberal	discourse	affirms	this	observation	as	it	must	carefully	
navigate	the	public’s	underlying	social	democratic	sentiments	and	
collective	sensibilities	all	while	simultaneously	attempting	to	undermine	
this	attachment.	
	
Neoliberalism in the New Saskatchewan 
The	advent	of	neoliberalism	in	Saskatchewan	certainly	did	not	begin	with	
Brad	Wall	and	the	Saskatchewan	Party.	Grant	Devine’s	Progressive	
Conservative	government	in	the	1980s	displayed	many	of	the	hallmarks	of	
neoliberal	politics	that	were	newly	emerging	at	the	time.	Similarly,	Roy	
Romanow’s	adoption	of	“Third	Way”	social	democracy	in	the	1990s	–	or	
what	others	have	called	“neoliberalism	with	a	human	face”	–	shifted	the	
provincial	New	Democratic	Party	(NDP)	away	from	the	traditional	politics	
of	social	democracy	towards	the	neoliberal	consensus	dominant	during	the	
period	(Hansen	2003;	McGrane	2006).	Therefore,	while	neoliberalism	is	
certainly	not	“new”	to	Saskatchewan,	Wall’s	Saskatchewan	Party	has	made	
a	concerted	effort	to	re‐package	neoliberalism	as	constituting	a	“new”	
politics	for	the	province.	How	the	Saskatchewan	Party	has	sought	to	“sell”	
its	own	variant	of	neoliberalism	to	the	Saskatchewan	public	is	the	primary	
focus	of	this	investigation.	
Brad	Wall’s	Saskatchewan	Party	government	has	embarked	on	a	
decidedly	neoliberal	agenda	since	it	first	came	to	power	in	2007.	Since	
taking	office,	the	Wall	government	has	rolled	back	the	rights	of	labour	with	
a	slew	of	legislation	designed	to	essentially	neuter	organized	labour’s	right	
to	strike	and	organize	in	the	workplace.3	Without	any	consultation	with	
organized	labour,	the	government	has	passed	Bill	5,	The	Public	Service	
Essential	Services	Act,	that	allows	employers	the	discretion	to	designate	
employees	“essential	service”	providers,	thereby	prohibiting	those	
                                                 
3 Wall characterized Saskatchewan’s previous labour legislation under the NDP as making the 
province “look like Québec or Cuba” (Wall, cited in Doll 2007). 
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classified	from	participating	in	strike	action.	Bill	6,	An	Act	to	Amend	the	
Trade	Union	Act,	enhances	the	ability	of	employers	to	“communicate	facts	
and	opinions”	to	workers	during	organizing	drives	and	changes	the	
certification	process	to	a	mandatory	secret	ballot	that	gives	employers	
more	license	to	intimidate	and	coerce	workers	(Saskatchewan	Federation	
of	Labour	2008).	Bill	80,	The	Construction	Industry	Labour	Relations	
Amendment	Act	permits	employers	to	"voluntarily	recognize"	a	particular	
union	if	the	shop	isn't	already	certified,	allowing	the	employer	to	select	the	
union	that	will	supposedly	represent	workers,	opening	the	way	for	quasi‐
yellow‐dog	unions	like	the	Christian	Labour	Association	of	Canada	(CLAC)	
to	gain	a	foothold	in	the	province’s	construction	industry	(Mandyrk	2009,	
A6).	More	recently,	the	government	introduced	Bill	43,	The	Trespass	to	
Property	Act,	which	has	the	potential	to	greatly	restrict	the	ability	of	
workers	to	picket	their	place	of	employment	during	strike	action.		
A	recent	International	Labour	Organization	(ILO)	decision	has	
offered	a	stinging	rebuke	to	the	government’s	package	of	labour	legislation.	
The	ILO	Freedom	of	Association	Committee	found,	among	other	things,	
that:	
	
The government had an obligation to consult with the labour movement and it 
failed to do so; that the new essential services legislation contravened the ILO’s 
principles on freedom of association by granting authority in the government 
itself to define what services are “essential” rather than an independent third 
party; and that the requirement for workers to have to collect union 
membership evidence on behalf of at least 45% eligible employees was too 
high since it would make it exceedingly difficult for workers to organize (Doorey 
2010). 
	
Indeed,	the	breadth	and	scope	of	the	Wall	government’s	attack	on	the	
labour	movement	in	Saskatchewan	has	resulted	in	the	Saskatchewan	
Federation	of	Labour	(SFL)	and	thirty	other	unions	and	locals	launching	a	
Charter	challenge	that	questions	the	very	constitutionality	of	the	
legislation	(Leader‐Post,	16	September	2008).4	
	 In	keeping	with	neoliberal	policy	prescriptions,	the	Wall	
government	has	shown	its	propensity	for	deregulation	by	entering	into	the	
New	West	Partnership	with	British	Columbia	and	Alberta.	The	agreement	‐	
a	carbon	copy	of	the	Trade,	Investment	and	Labour	Mobility	Agreement	
(TILMA)	that	the	government	had	previously	opposed	‐	purports	to	
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of the court challenge, see Muthu 2010. 
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remove	‘barriers’	to	trade	and	investment	between	the	three	provinces	and	
invests	the	power	to	ultimately	determine	what	measures	constitute	a	
restriction	or	impairment	of	trade	within	an	unelected	trade	panel.	Critics	
of	the	agreement	fear	it	will	lead	to	a	“race	to	the	bottom”	as	the	lowest	
standards	and	regulations	of	each	respective	province	are	adopted	as	the	
least	restrictive	to	inter‐provincial	trade	(Gilbert	2010).5	Recent	moves	by	
the	Wall	government	to	endorse	the	Canadian	Federation	of	Independent	
Business	(CFIB)	“Red	Tape	Awareness	Week”	as	a	means	to	“identifying	
and	eliminating	regulatory	or	bureaucratic	requirements	that	serve	as	
barriers	to	growth,”	presage	an	even	more	intense	deregulatory	campaign	
in	the	future	(Wood	2011).	
	 The	Wall	government	has	been	less	aggressive	on	the	privatization	
front,	mainly	due	to	the	public’s	attachment	to	the	provincial	crown	
corporations.	Indeed,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	the	Saskatchewan	
Party’s	failure	to	win	the	2003	provincial	election	hinged	on	the	Party’s	
reluctance	to	rule	out	privatization	of	the	crowns	during	the	campaign	
(McGrane	2008;	Rayner	and	Beaudry‐Mellor	2009).6	However,	the	
government	has	restricted	the	operations	of	the	crowns	through	its	
“Saskatchewan	First”	policy	that	forced	the	crowns	to	divest	of	their	out‐of‐
province	assets	and	discouraged	the	crowns	from	“competing	with	the	
private	sector”	within	the	province	(Star‐Phoenix,	28	October	2008).	Lastly,	
while	the	government	has	not	pursued	an	openly	ambitious	plan	of	
privatization,	they	are	in	the	process	of	selling	off	the	Saskatchewan	
Communications	Network	(SCN)	‐	a	public	education	cable	channel	‐	in	
response	to	budget	shortfalls	resulting	from	the	collapse	of	potash	
revenues	in	2009‐2010	(Wood	2010,	A1).	Furthermore,	the	government	
has	not	been	reluctant	to	contract	out	public	services	to	private	providers,	
with	the	opening	of	the	privately	owned	Omni	Surgical	Centre	in	Regina	
the	most	recent	example	(Cowan	and	Hall	2010,	A1).	
	 One	of	the	key	principles	of	neoliberal	governance	is	the	
prioritization	of	market	logic	as	a	principle	of	government	itself	(Couldry	
2010).	The	Wall	government’s	embrace	of	this	aspect	of	neoliberalism	is	
best	exemplified	by	their	out‐sourcing	of	economic	development	policy	to	
“Enterprise	Saskatchewan,”	a	multi‐sector	government	agency	tasked	with	
                                                 
5 For a critique of the original TILMA agreement, see Weir 2007. 
6 Brad Wall himself acknowledged this, conceding that “the biggest mistake the Saskatchewan 
Party  has  made  in  its  ten  years,”  was  “not  being  clear  enough  on  its  stance  on  Crown 
corporations and not respecting the citizens’ strong desire to keep them public” (Wall cited in 
Mandryk 2007, A16). 
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providing	recommendations	and	advice	for	the	removal	and	reduction	of	
barriers	to	economic	growth	within	the	province.	The	self‐declared	role	of	
the	agency	is	to	“create	the	best	environment	for	business	‐	and	then	get	
out	of	the	way”	(Enterprise	Saskatchewan	2010).		Enterprise	
Saskatchewan	has	been	the	showpiece	of	the	government’s	economic	
policy	since	2004.	The	agency	is	designed	to	“take	the	politics	out	of	
economic	development”	by	preventing	the	picking	of	“winners	and	losers”	
by	the	government.	For	the	“first	time	in	Saskatchewan,”	the	Enterprise	
Saskatchewan	Plan	will	see	“government	cede	significant	control	over	the	
formation	and	implementation	of	economic	development	strategies	to	a	
broad	partnership	of	economic	stakeholders	with	the	full	support	of	the	
Premier	and	Executive	Council”	(Saskatchewan	Party	2004,	11).	However,	
despite	the	claims	of	inclusion,	the	board	is	actually	dominated	by	business	
representatives	with	only	a	token	representative	from	organized	labour.	
That	any	consideration	at	all	beyond	the	interests	of	business	are	attended	
to	by	the	agency	is	belied	by	its	own	slogan,	“our	business	is	business”	
(Enterprise	Saskatchewan	2010).		
	 Enterprise	Saskatchewan	and	the	government’s	attitude	towards	
past	efforts	of	economic	development	in	the	province	provides	an	ideal	
launching	point	to	investigate	the	government’s	construction	of	the	“New	
Saskatchewan”	discourse	and	how	it	attempts	to	support	the	advancement	
of	the	neoliberal	project	in	the	province.		
	
The Discourse of the New Saskatchewan 
As	the	above	suggests,	the	NS	discourse	is	premised	on	creating	a	binary	
opposition	between	the	future	and	the	past,	with	the	province’s	social	
democratic	past	responsible	for	stagnation	and	lethargy,	while	the	
neoliberal	future	is	associated	with	optimism	and	prosperity.	Within	
Saskatchewan	Party	discourse	on	economic	development,	this	binary	is	
ever‐present.	According	to	this	narrative,	Saskatchewan	has	consistently	
failed	to	realize	its	economic	potential,	despite	being	blessed	with	an	
abundance	of	natural	resources	and	the	most	fertile	farmland	in	the	
country:	
	
Saskatchewan’s wealth in human and natural resources is truly staggering. 
Given our potential, Saskatchewan should have finished the 20th century as 
one of Canada’s economic leaders ‐ ready to compete in the emerging global 
economy. Instead, our province entered this century after having spent most of 
the last century as a ‘have‐not’ province (Saskatchewan Party 2004, 1). 
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The	blame	for	this	economic	malaise	is	squarely	placed	on	the	social	
democratic	economic	policies	of	the	past:	
	
Perhaps we have become comfortable with the notion that geographically large 
and sparsely populated jurisdictions must rely on the public sector and 
government involvement at every turn for their economic development 
strategies. This would appear to be the case in Saskatchewan, where 
governments of three different political stripes have allowed public sector 
solutions to eclipse the potential of private investment, innovation and 
entrepreneurship as sustainable economic development options for growth 
(Saskatchewan Party 2004, 2).7 
	
The	results	of	pursuing	this	state‐led	economic	strategy	is	characterized	as	
an	abject	failure:	
	
It is clear that Saskatchewan’s economic strategy over the past 60 years has 
failed to improve the integrity of our economy, grow our population, attract 
investment or adequately capture and commercialize intellectual capital and 
innovation. It’s time to try something new (Saskatchewan Party 2004, 6). 
	
In	order	to	unleash	the	full	economic	potential	of	the	province,	neoliberal	
policy	prescriptions	must	be	applied	generously	to	every	facet	of	the	
economy	in	order	to	remove	the	barriers	to	growth	that	have	been	left	to	
harden	over	the	past	sixty	years.	In	this	sense,	the	application	of	neoliberal	
principles	allows	the	province	to	return	to	a	historical	trajectory	of	
prosperity	that	had	been	de‐railed	by	the	adoption	of	social	democracy.	
Brad	Wall	makes	this	explicit:	
	
After 1941 something changed, and the optimism of the past shifted...Our 
leadership for much of the last 60 years forgot that Saskatchewan was built by 
individuals and by families and by communities and not by government...It is a 
leadership, I believe, that has resigned our province to mediocrity at best and 
                                                 
7  It  is  interesting  to note  the blame here  is placed on all past governing political parties  for 
advancing  public  sector  solutions  over  and  above  the  private  sector  ‐  despite  the  prior 
governing Liberal and Conservative parties’ vocal advocacy for “free enterprise.” In this sense, 
the Saskatchewan Party appears more  intent on  indicting  the past political culture of  social 
democracy in the province, rather than just the New Democratic Party alone. 
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unsustainability at worst...it is a government that has more memories of the 
past than dreams for the future (Wall cited in Saccone 2005, A9).8 
	
The	renewal	of	optimism	and	confidence	in	the	province	with	the	
election	of	the	Wall	government	is	a	much	vaunted	part	of	the	NS	
discourse,	as	the	freeing	of	private	enterprise	from	the	shackles	of	the	past	
is	said	to	coincide	with	an	“attitudinal	change”	and	a	“new	collective	vision”	
for	the	province	(Wall	2010).	In	opposition	to	the	“old	Saskatchewan,”	the	
“New	Saskatchewan”	desires	to	inculcate	the	province	with	a	new	
entrepreneurial	spirit,	which	fosters	“job‐creators”	rather	than	“job‐
takers:”		
	
In our platform we talked very specifically about increasing the availability of 
entrepreneurial education in our school system, or at least introducing the 
option wherever we can. We have done a great job in our province over the 
years, (with) a great education system. But we train job takers and we ought to 
be introducing the concept of people considering being job makers. There are 
some things we can do from an educational standpoint with regard to [sic] 
entrepreneurial and an entrepreneurial environment (Wall cited in Moen 
2008).9 
	
According	to	the	government,	this	new	“enterprising,	entrepreneurial	
Saskatchewan	economy	will	be	impatient,	relentless,	aggressive,	self‐
promoting	and	even	brash.	Profit	within	that	economy	will	be	lauded	
instead	of	envied”	(Saskatchewan	Party	2004,	27).	
	 The	deployment	of	such	entrepreneurial	discourse	by	neoliberal	
governments	is	certainly	not	new,	as	it	has	a	long	history	going	back	to	the	
Margaret	Thatcher	government	of	the	1980s	(See	Abercrombie	and	Keat	
1990;	Peters	2001).	Indeed,	Thatcher’s	view	of	enterprising	culture	was	
inextricably	linked	to	the	political	and	the	moral	challenge	supposedly	
posed	by	the	“permissive	and	anti‐enterprise	culture	fostered	by	social	
democratic	institutions	since	1945”	(Smyth	1999,	440‐441).	Certainly,	it	is	
a	central	tenet	of	neoliberalism	that	the	Keynesian	policies	of	social	
                                                 
8 Why Wall chose 1941 as the date “something changed” is curious given that Liberal premier 
William  J. Patterson was  in power. However,  three years  later Tommy Douglas and  the CCF 
would win their first provincial election. 
9 According  to  the Saskatchewan Party’s 2007 platform: “A Saskatchewan Party government 
will  work  with  local  school  boards,  the  business  community  and  community  based 
organizations such as  Junior Achievement, to enhance business  literacy, entrepreneurial and 
career education in Saskatchewan schools” (Saskatchewan Party 2007, 6).  
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protection	contributed	to	a	“risk	adverse”	society	that	eliminates	many	of	
the	incentives	to	create	wealth;	a	position	that	would	most	certainly	garner	
sympathy	within	the	Saskatchewan	Party	(Rothenberg	1984,	148).			
As	Michael	Peters	(2001,	60‐61)	argues,	neoliberal	appeals	for	an	
“enterprise	culture”	are	premised	on	the	need	for	cultural	reconstruction	
in	order	to	ensure	economic	survival	within	the	competitive	global	
economy.	The	term	“enterprise”	is	often	used	as	an	antidote	to	an	alleged	
“culture	of	dependency”	promoted	by	the	Keynesian	welfare	state	that	can	
only	be	overcome	through	the	acquisition	of	entrepreneurial	values	of	self‐
reliance,	personal	investment,	competition	and	market	rationality.	This	is	
in	direct	opposition	to	social	democratic	principles	of	equality,	equity	and	
collective	social	provision.		
	 While	the	NS	discourse	is	careful	not	to	accuse	the	people	of	
Saskatchewan	of	a	culture	of	dependency,	it	certainly	indicts	governments	
past	of	fostering	such	a	climate.	For	example,	Brad	Wall’s	well‐worn	“New	
Saskatchewan”	speech	accuses	the	“Saskatchewan	that	was”	as	one	of	
“managed	decline,”	always	“looking	for	a	hand‐out”	from	the	rest	of	the	
country,	whereas	the	“Saskatchewan	that	is,”	“plans	for	growth,”	with	“its	
sleeves	rolled	up”	ready	to	work	for	greater	prosperity	(Wall	2010).		
	 Indeed,	this	representation	of	past	social	democratic	governments	
as	an	indolent	elite	that	leeches	off	the	wealth	of	others	is	made	explicit	by	
Brad	Wall	in	his	parody	of	Tommy	Douglas’	famous	“Mouseland”	speech	
that	Wall	delivered	to	the	2006	Saskatchewan	Party	convention	and	which	
is	worth	quoting	at	length.10	In	Wall’s	“updated”	rendition,	‘Mouseland’	has	
been	governed	by	the	mice	for	sixty	years:	
	
But after sixty years, other animals began to realize something about mice. 
They’re not exactly the most productive species in the animal kingdom. In fact, 
they don’t really produce anything except droppings. What they are good at is 
wrecking stuff that others have produced. They chew holes in things. They just 
generally leave a mess wherever they go.... ‘We can’t get rid of the mice. The 
mice run things. The mice have always run things. That’s why they call it 
Mouseland.’  And all the other animals heard this and just nodded sadly in 
agreement. Except for one old gray horse named Milt. He’d been around longer 
than the rest of the animals...  And he said, ‘That’s not quite true.’ ‘The mice 
don’t have to run things. In fact,’ he said ‘when given a clear choice between 
cats and mice…who would choose a mouse? They wreck things!’ And at that 
moment, all the other animals looked up and down the line… And they realized 
                                                 
10  For the original Douglas “Mouseland” speech, visit http://www.saskndp.com/mouseland.  
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something. There were more of them than there were mice. They were all 
different animals, but they had a lot of things in common. They didn’t like the 
mice wrecking all their food. They didn’t like their babies moving to that place 
that had never been run by the mice. They didn’t like standing in line when 
they were sick. Most of all, they were just tired of the mice. They began to 
realize that a lot of mice in one place for a long time is not a government but an 
infestation! (Wall 2006).11 
	
Besides	flirting	dangerously	with	an	almost	reactionary	producerist	
rhetoric,	Wall’s	parody	captures	numerous	themes	of	the	NS	discourse	
outlined	thus	far;	sixty	years	of	inept	social	democratic	policies	have	
relegated	Saskatchewan	to	‘have‐not’	status,	squandering	the	province’s	
vast	economic	potential	in	exchange	for	mediocrity	and	a	culture	of	
defeat.12		
	 The	New	Democratic	Party	is	regularly	portrayed	as	mired	in	this	
fictive	past,	representative	of	the	“old”	Saskatchewan,	tied	to	tired	and	
outmoded	ideologies	and	ways	of	thinking	(Saskatchewan	Party	2007;	
Wall	2010).13	In	contrast,	the	Wall	government’s	neoliberal	policies	are	
“non‐ideological,”	“pragmatic”	and	“common‐sense.”	Responding	to	
Leader‐Post	reporter	Angela	Hall’s	question	on	whether	the	government	
would	adopt	“a	broader	conservative	agenda”	in	a	second	term,	Wall	
replied:	
	
I don’t know what that means, but just offhand I think you’re going to see more 
common sense solutions to problems we have...All of the examples you’ve 
cited, I don’t think that’s left, middle or right, I think it’s common sense. And 
we’ll always be responsive to those kinds of ideas (Wall cited in Hall 2010a). 
	
                                                 
11 In Wall’s rendition, the “cats”  ‐ originally representing the bourgeoisie in Douglas’ version ‐ 
rescue Mouseland from the inept rule of the “mice.” Wall’s parody could therefore be seen as 
inadvertently  confirming  David  Harvey’s  hypothesis  that  neoliberalism  is  all  about  the 
“restoration  of  class  power,”  as  the  bourgeoisie  are  once  again  restored  to  their  rightful 
position of rule! (See Harvey 2005, 16). 
12 As Chip Bertlet and Matthew Lyons (2000, 6) explain, “one of the staples of repressive and 
right‐wing populist  ideology has been producerism, a doctrine  that champions  the  so‐called 
producers in society against both “unproductive” elites and subordinate groups defined as lazy 
or immoral.” 
13 Current NDP  leader Dwain Lingenfelter, who could quite accurately be characterized as a 
third way neoliberal, is regularly portrayed in this light, with Brad Wall depicting him as “a 70’s 
era figure in thrall to nationalization and “Fonzie lunchboxes” and out of touch with the “New 
Saskatchewan” (Wall cited in Wood 2010b, A5). 
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Similarly,	in	his	“State	of	the	Province”	address	to	the	Saskatoon	Chamber	
of	Commerce,	Wall	again	portrays	his	government	as	the	pragmatic	
alternative	to	an	ideologically	driven	past:		
	
You will see from our government we are not ideologically limited to the way 
we fund these projects in the future. We will be open to public‐private 
partnerships. We will be open to partnerships with other members of the 
public sector, with the municipal sector, with federal government and with the 
private sector. We are going to be interested in results in dealing with this 
infrastructure deficit, not ideologically handcuffed by pursuing it only in the 
ways the Government of Saskatchewan has pursued it in the past (Wall 2008).14 
	
As	many	other	scholars	have	demonstrated,	claims	that	neoliberalism	is	
“non‐ideological,”	“beyond	left	and	right,”	and	a	“common	sense”	approach	
to	politics	are	a	central	facet	of	neoliberal	discourse	(Clarke	2008;	Coulter	
2009;	Weiler	1984).	Weiler’s	description	of	the	discursive	representation	
of	neoliberal	politicians	is	particularly	germane	to	how	Brad	Wall’s	
Saskatchewan	Party	seeks	to	represent	itself:			
	
Neo‐liberals are not burdened with ideological baggage. They are new 
politicians with new solutions to the allegedly new problems we face. They are 
experimenters uninterested in tedious quibbles about method. They are 
bottom‐line men [sic]; they are interested in results (Weiler 1984, 367). 
	
However,	as	Kendra	Coulter	(2009,	38)	observes,	such	claims	seek	to	
“obfuscate	ideological	allegiance	and	camouflage	an	ideological	agenda”	by	
framing	political	decisions	that	have	profound	and	differing	effects	on	
various	elements	within	society	as	non‐ideological	problems	in	need	of	
technical	solutions.	Such	discourse	seeks	to	erase	consideration	of	
structural	or	systemic	inequalities	of	power	by	concealing	the	problems	
and	conflicts	of	politics	behind	an	appeal	to	technical	expertise	(Clarke	
2008,	142).	In	this	respect,	“the	very	denial	of	ideology	is	an	ideological	
act”	as	neoliberalism	‐	a	decidedly	political	project	‐	is	cloaked	in	the	
                                                 
14 The Wall government’s decision to oppose the BHP Billiton takeover bid for PotashCorp was 
also framed as “pragmatic” and “strategic” in response to criticisms from the ideological right 
that the Saskatchewan Party had betrayed its free‐market principles. It may be more true that 
the  Wall  government  is  tremendously  reliant  on  potash  revenues  ‐  which  at  its  height 
contributed  to  one‐fifth  of  provincial  revenues  ‐  in  order  to  advance  its  neoliberal  agenda 
more broadly. See CBC News 2009. 
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respectability	of	being	non‐political;	merely	a	natural,	common	sense	
approach	to	problem	solving	(Coulter	2009,	38‐39).	
	 As	we	have	seen,	the	NS	discourse	contains	many	of	the	hallmarks	
of	neoliberal	discourse	more	generally;	it	contains	a	narrative	of	growth	
and	progress	juxtaposed	with	the	demonization	of	a	social	democratic	
political	culture	responsible	for	stagnation	and	a	“culture	of	dependency.”	
It	advocates	for	an	“enterprise	culture”	that	seeks	to	inculcate	
entrepreneurial	values	as	the	means	with	which	to	escape	our	under‐
achieving,	collectivist	past	and	it	represents	itself	as	non‐ideological	and	
non‐political,	all	while	advancing	a	decidedly	political	project.	However,	
how	“new”	is	this	“‘New	Saskatchewan”	discourse?	Brad	Wall	and	the	
Saskatchewan	Party	continually	depict	themselves	and	their	policies	as	
representing	a	break	from	the	past.	However,	upon	closer	scrutiny	the	New	
Saskatchewan	discourse	reveals	itself	to	be	not	so	novel	after	all.	
	
The Historical Origins of the “New Saskatchewan” 
The	NS	discourse	regularly	indicts	its	opponents	as	being	mired	in	the	past,	
in	the	“old”	Saskatchewan.	Yet,	the	genealogy	of	the	New	Saskatchewan	
discourse	illustrates	that	is	equally	a	product	of	the	past.		
In	1964,	the	provincial	Liberals	under	the	leadership	of	Ross	
Thatcher	defeated	the	NDP	after	twenty	years	in	power.	Thatcher’s	
promise	to	the	electorate:	to	bring	them	a	“New	Saskatchewan”	(Gruending	
1990;	Eisler	1987).	With	rhetoric	that	is	eerily	familiar	to	the	present,	
Thatcher	declared	the	province	under	his	leadership,	once	again	“open	for	
business,”	expressing	confidence	in	private	enterprise	through	
“regulations,	legislation	and	support	of	the	entrepreneur”	that	would	make	
Saskatchewan	a	safe	and	profitable	climate	for	private	investment	(Eisler	
1987,	156‐157).	For	Thatcher,	the	province	was	“only	now	recovering	from	
an	unhappy	20‐year	experiment	with	socialism,	an	experiment	that	has	
cost	the	province	very	dearly	in	jobs	and	economic	development”	(ibid,	
157).	Starkly	reminiscent	of	today,	Thatcher’s	“New	Saskatchewan”	
promised	to	unleash	the	full	economic	potential	of	the	province	‐	stifled	
under	the	socialist	CCF/NDP	‐	through	a	wave	of	all	too	familiar	policies:	
“reduce	corporate	royalties	and	taxation,	slash	the	size	and	influence	of	
government	(especially	by	attacking	social	spending),	sell‐off	government‐
owned	enterprises	to	the	private	sector	and	bring	the	labour	movement	to	
heel”	(Gruending	1990,	49).	
	 While	Thatcher	was	unable	to	achieve	many	of	these	goals	during	
his	time	in	office,	Dale	Eisler	(2005,	81)	argues	that	Thatcher	remains	a	
transformative	figure	because	his	government	introduced	the	myth	of	a	
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greater	future	by	advancing	the	argument	that	the	“end	of	a	socialist	
government,	a	more	welcoming	attitude	to	free	enterprise	and	foreign	
investment—particularly	from	the	US—would	unlock	our	true	economic	
potential	and	the	myth	would	finally	be	achieved.”15	
	 These	ideas	would	be	recycled	once	again	during	the	Progressive	
Conservative	government	of	Grant	Devine	in	the	1980s.	While	the	
Saskatchewan	Tories	did	not	replicate	the	use	of	the	term	“New	
Saskatchewan,”	they	nevertheless	borrowed	many	of	its	elements.	Devine’s	
1982	campaign	slogan,	“There’s	so	much	more	we	can	be,”	again	raised	the	
specter	of	the	province’s	unrealized	economic	potential.	Similar	to	
Saskatchewan	Party	rhetoric,	the	NDP	was	also	indicted	as	growing	fat	off	
the	province	at	the	people’s	expense.	As	one	Devine	campaign	brochure	
read,	“Saskatchewan’s	great	potential	has	never	been	more	clear.	Yet	only	
the	government	has	grown	rich”	(Progressive	Conservative	Party	of	
Saskatchewan	1982).	Like	the	Saskatchewan	Party	today,	the	Devine	
government	also	sought	to	establish	a	binary	between	a	stagnant	past	and	
a	prosperous	future:	
	
The good old province of Saskatchewan is not going to be the same anymore ‐ 
we’re not going to be seventh or eighth anymore ‐ we’re going to be number 
one (Devine cited in Nunn 1982). 
The new spirit of the Saskatchewan people will not turn the clock back (Devine 
cited in Scott 1986a). 
The choice is between taking the next step forward into the future or stepping 
back into the past (Devine cited in Scott 1986b).	
	
The	means	to	achieving	this	prosperous	future	would	of	course	require	the	
“freeing”	of	private	investment	from	the	imposed	constraints	of	past	social	
democratic	governments.	Echoing	Ross	Thatcher,	Devine	declared	the	
province	“open	for	business,”	rescinding	750	regulations	in	his	first	year	of	
office,	slashing	corporate	taxes	and	royalty	rates,	privatizing	major	crown	
corporations	such	as	the	Potash	Corporation	of	Saskatchewan,	
SaskMinerals	and	SaskOil,	and	restricting	the	right	of	labour	to	organize	
(Biggs	and	Stobbe	1991;	Pitsula	and	Rasmussen	1990;	Spencer	2007).		
                                                 
15 Eisler (2005, 72) argues that the “myth of Saskatchewan” is premised on the enduring belief 
that  “Saskatchewan  has  a  much  greater  economic  and  social  potential  than  what  it  has 
achieved.” According  to Eisler,  this unfulfilled expectation  is  the  “essential  force  that drives 
Saskatchewan’s economic and political discourse” (70). 
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	 The	Devine	Tories	were	also	in	thrall	of	Thatcherite	“Enterprise	
Culture,”	believing	the	government	needed	to	“awaken	the	entrepreneurial	
spirit	of	the	people.”	Indeed,	Health	Minister	Graham	Taylor	admitted	that	
at	the	heart	of	the	Devine	government’s	privatization	agenda	was	the	need	
“to	change	the	thinking	of	the	Saskatchewan	people”	(Pitsula	and	
Rasmussen	1990,	152).			
	 Finally,	like	the	Saskatchewan	Party	of	today,	these	political	
decisions	were	framed	as	being	“above	politics.”	As	Pitsula	and	Rasmussen	
state:	
	
This was typical of Devine. Whenever he wanted to push the province to the 
right, he claimed to be motivated by ‘common sense’ or to be doing something 
that ‘no reasonable person could object to.’ It was a technique for softening his 
hard ideological edges (Pitsula and Rasmussen 1990, 48). 
	
What	this	very	brief	historical	summary	reveals	is	that	the	“New	
Saskatchewan”	discourse	treads	upon	some	very	old	ground.	Rather	than	a	
break	from	the	past,	Brad	Wall	and	the	Saskatchewan	Party	have	
resuscitated	many	of	the	same	narratives	deployed	by	every	other	
governing	party	that	has	been	in	opposition	to	the	NDP.	So	how	does	the	
current	use	of	NS	discourse	differ	from	that	of	the	past?	
	 In	many	respects	the	NS	discourse	of	today	operates	in	a	much	
more	favourable	environment	due	to	the	general	acceptance	of	
neoliberalism	as	the	only	possible	politics	in	an	era	of	globalized	economic	
competition	(Harvey	2005).16	At	the	national	level,	Canadians	have	been	
inundated	with	the	argument	that	neoliberalism	is	the	only	way	to	ensure	
our	economic	competitiveness	for	the	past	thirty	years	(Clarke	1997;	
Enoch	2007).17	In	Saskatchewan,	the	public	is	regularly	counselled	–	by	
governments	of	all	stripes	–	that	we	must	emulate	or	surpass	the	
conservative	policies	of	our	neighbour	Alberta,	lest	we	be	passed	over	for	
private	investment	(Hansen	2003;	Rushton	2000).	Furthermore,	with	the	
NDP’s	embrace	of	third	way	neoliberalism	since	the	early	1990s,	there	is	
little	in	the	way	of	an	alternative	to	neoliberal	policies	offered	to	the	
Saskatchewan	populace.	Many	of	the	current	government’s	policies	are	the	
mere	continuation	of	trends	originally	advanced	under	the	NDP	‐	
                                                 
16 Whether  the general public accepts neoliberalism as  the only possible politics  is certainly 
contested. However,  there  can be  little argument  that among political and economic elites, 
neoliberalism enjoys broad support (See Enoch 2007; Miller 2010). 
17 For example, the recent debate over corporate taxation has invariably been framed by the 
Federal Tories as required to ensure Canada’s economic competitiveness (See Taber 2011). 
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particularly	in	regards	to	taxes	and	competition	policy	(McGrane	2006;	
Weir	2004).18	Thus,	the	NDP	has	“prepared	the	way”	for	the	acceptance	of	
neoliberalism	for	much	of	the	population	by	advancing	many	of	these	
policies	under	the	banner	of	social	democracy.	There	is	obviously	less	
room	for	ideological	polarization	when	both	of	the	mainline	parties	are	in	
agreement	on	key	aspects	of	economic	policy.		
	 That	being	said,	the	Saskatchewan	Party	has	been	quite	careful	to	
measure	its	discourse	so	as	not	to	upset	the	underlying	social	democratic	
sensibilities	that	still	have	purchase	amongst	a	significant	portion	of	the	
electorate.	As	Pitsula	and	Rasmussen	(1990,	3)	observe,	“the	well‐
entrenched	social	democratic	tradition	of	the	province	requires	right‐wing	
political	parties	in	the	Province	to	package	their	ideology	and	policy	ideas	
carefully	so	as	not	to	offend	large	sections	of	the	electorate.”	While	these	
traditions	may	be	less	“well‐entrenched”	today,	they	nevertheless	exist,	as	
the	Saskatchewan	Party	discovered	to	their	dismay	during	the	2003	
election.	Thus,	the	NS	discourse	has	refused	to	adopt	the	language	of	
aggressive	privatization	that	characterized	the	Devine‐era	and	have	not	
sought	to	emulate	(at	least	not	to	the	same	degree)	the	vicious	red‐baiting	
of	the	Thatcher	years,	although	it	still	regularly	paints	the	NDP	as	much	
more	to	the	left	of	the	political	spectrum	than	they	actually	are.		
	 Perhaps	in	recognition	of	these	underlying	sensibilities,	the	NS	
discourse	has	also	put	forward	the	notion	that	it	is	the	Saskatchewan	Party,	
rather	than	the	NDP,	that	is	the	true	defender	of	the	vulnerable	and	the	
poor.	Touting	their	social	policy	initiatives	in	the	2008	Throne	Speech,	
Premier	Wall	attempted	to	undermine	the	association	between	the	NDP	
and	care	for	society’s	most	vulnerable:	
	
From a government, from a social democratic government — a group, some 
self‐described socialists — who say, boy, nobody cares like us. That’s what they 
claim. Nobody is there for those who are vulnerable like us in the NDP. Nobody 
will be there for those who have disabilities or for those without a voice than 
us. But, Mr Speaker, the truth of it is they weren't there for them — not for 
years and years and years (Throne Speech Debate 2008). 
	
                                                 
18  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  ultra‐conservative  Fraser  Institute  praised  “the  historic 
transformation” of economic policy under the NDP in 2007, ranking the province the third best 
climate  for  private  investment  in  the  country.  Brad Wall’s  “New  Saskatchewan”  has more 
recently  been  touted  as  the  second  best  province  for  investment  by  the  Fraser,  following 
behind only Alberta. See Abma 2010; Wood 2007.  
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In	contrast,	Brad	Wall’s	New	Saskatchewan	will	offer,	“growth	and	
opportunity,	security	and	compassion”	(Throne	Speech	Debate	2008,	my	
emphasis).	While	usurping	the	historic	mantle	of	social	justice	from	the	
NDP	may	prove	difficult,	the	use	of	compassion	within	the	NS	discourse	
allows	the	Saskatchewan	Party	to	advance	its	neoliberal	agenda	while	
potentially	pre‐empting	criticisms	that	it	is	neglecting	the	most	vulnerable	
in	the	province.19		
Thus,	the	NS	discourse	has	proved	highly	adept	at	negotiating	the	
eccentricities	of	Saskatchewan	politics.	While	it	has	been	careful	to	
measure	itself	so	as	not	to	offend	the	social	democratic	sensibilities	of	a	
large	portion	of	the	electorate,	it	has	also	promoted	the	neoliberalization	of	
the	province	as	the	means	to	which	Saskatchewan	can	finally	achieve	its	
untapped	economic	potential.	By	linking	the	recent	economic	prosperity	of	
the	province	to	the	politics	of	the	“New	Saskatchewan,”	it	simultaneously	
associates	all	past	economic	malaise	as	the	sole	property	of	the	social	
democrats	and	their	economic	policies,	despite	the	long	embrace	of	
neoliberalism	by	successive	NDP	governments	since	1991.		Moreover,	
rather	than	associating	neoliberalism	with	“tough	choices”	and	“austerity,”	
the	NS	discourse	portrays	neoliberal	economic	policy	as	the	fount	of	
prosperity,	finally	able	to	flow	freely	now	that	the	ideologically	imposed	
restraints	of	the	past	have	been	jettisoned.	In	this	respect,	the	discourse	of	
the	New	Saskatchewan	is	able	to	sell	the	neoliberal	project	without	resort	
to	crisis	rhetoric.	If	there	is	any	element	of	fear	within	the	NS	discourse,	it	
is	the	fear	that	a	return	to	the	social	democratic	policies	of	the	past	will	
mean	a	return	to	economic	mediocrity.	
	
Conclusions 
While	it	is	impossible	to	measure	what	influence	the	NS	discourse	has	had	
on	the	people	of	Saskatchewan,	there	is	no	doubting	the	popularity	of	the	
current	government.	Recent	polls	show	the	Saskatchewan	Party	the	
preferred	choice	of	57.3	percent	of	the	electorate,	with	Brad	Wall	
considered	the	“best	choice	for	premier”	by	a	whopping	73.3	percent	of	
respondents	(Hall	2010b).	In	light	of	such	poll	numbers,	New	Democrat	
sources	are	“suggesting	that	the	party	could	be	decimated	to	between	four	
and	eight	seats”	in	the	next	election.	Others	are	even	more	pessimistic,	
                                                 
19 While much of the Saskatchewan Party’s social agenda is in the traditional neoliberal vein of 
“growing a bigger economic pie” rather than redistributing the “existing economic pie,” they 
have made modest  increases to social assistance rates and other  low‐income supports For a 
discussion on neoliberal approaches to social justice, see Wicker 1981.  
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raising	the	prospect	of	the	party	being	wiped	out	completely	(Mandryk	
2011).	While	careful	not	to	draw	too	many	conclusions	from	these	
numbers,	it	certainly	appears	that	the	NS	discourse	has	resonated	with	
Saskatchewan	voters,	as	its	message	of	prosperity	and	optimism	appears	to	
align	with	the	current	mood	of	the	public	(Gray	2009).		
	 However,	given	the	fragile	nature	of	resource‐based	economies	and	
the	vagaries	of	world	commodity	markets,	the	discourse	of	the	New	
Saskatchewan	may	prove	as	fleeting	as	its	predecessors.	Saskatchewan	has	
always	been	particularly	prone	to	the	cyclical	nature	of	the	global	
economy,	characterized	by	periods	of	“Boom	and	Bust.”	While	the	NS	
discourse	is	quick	to	argue	that	those	days	are	part	of	the	“old”	
Saskatchewan	and	that	those	who	might	counsel	caution	to	the	current	
heady	optimism	are	“running	down”	the	province,	the	track	record	of	
neoliberalism	sustaining	economic	growth	in	other	parts	of	the	world	
should	give	us	pause.		
	 As	many	other	scholars	have	forcefully	argued,	neoliberalism	as	a	
strategy	for	economic	growth	has	been	a	broad	failure	‐	particularly	in	
comparison	to	the	state‐led	industrial	strategies	of	the	Keynesian	era	
(Chang	2008;	Harvey	2005;	Kotz	and	McDonough	2008).	Harvey	argues	
that	while	neoliberalism	has	not	been	very	successful	at	generating	wealth,	
it	has	been	tremendously	successful	at	redistributing	wealth	upwards.	
Indeed,	Harvey	(2005,	16)	states	that,	“redistributive	effects	and	increasing	
social	inequality	have	in	fact	been	such	a	persistent	feature	of	
neoliberalization	as	to	be	regarded	as	structural	to	the	whole	project.”	The	
advent	of	neoliberalism	in	Saskatchewan	has	produced	similar	results,	
with	increased	inequality	of	earnings	evident	among	Saskatchewan	
families	over	the	past	thirty	years.	Over	this	period,	
	
The richest 10 per cent of Saskatchewan families took home the lion’s share of 
the province’s economic growth, increasing its share of earnings from twenty‐
three to twenty‐eight per cent. The bottom half of Saskatchewan families have 
found themselves shut out from economic gains and their share of earnings 
dropped from twenty‐six to twenty‐three percent (Gingrich 2009, 41). 
	
Furthermore,	inequality	in	the	province	has	been	particularly	acute	since	
2000,	with	Saskatchewan’s	after‐tax	income	gap	in	2006	the	third	worst	in	
all	of	Canada	(Gingrich	2009).		
	 Whether	the	people	of	the	province	will	accept	such	growing	
inequalities	as	an	inevitable	part	of	the	‘New	Saskatchewan’	is	an	open	
question.	So	far,	it	appears	the	NS	narrative	of	unlimited	prosperity	and	
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growth	has	managed	to	conceal	the	more	ugly	consequences	of	
neoliberalism	from	public	view.	However,	while	the	NS	discourse	has	been	
aided	and	abetted	by	the	economic	prosperity	recently	experienced	by	the	
province,	should	Saskatchewan’s	own	brand	of	neoliberalism	demonstrate	
the	same	instability	and	penchant	for	crisis	as	it	has	in	the	rest	of	the	
world,	the	Wall	government	may	yet	have	to	return	to	the	rhetoric	of	crisis	
in	order	to	convince	the	Saskatchewan	public	to	remain	on	the	neoliberal	
path.	
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